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POLICE INTERROGATION, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND
ALLEGED CHILD ABUSE CASES
Richard A. Leo*
I want to thank Justice McCormack for that great introduction. I
want to thank Anna and Ben for having me here and for putting on
this important Symposium. It’s a great honor to be at the University
of Michigan, one of the great universities in the country and cer-
tainly one of the great law schools. It’s always great to be in this
building. When Justice McCormack’s assistant contacted me, I
didn’t do what I usually do and send a bio and a CV. Instead, I sent
her a 2012 opinion by the Michigan Supreme Court that trashed
me and the scientific discipline that has empirically studied police
interrogation and false confessions for more than a century. It’s the
Kowalski opinion.1
The Michigan Supreme Court not only trashed the science of
false confessions, but it also upheld the exclusion of my testimony
in a case where the defendant was almost certainly innocent.2 The
Michigan Supreme Court’s shameful and retrograde opinion
meant that Mr. Kowalski didn’t get the chance to have an expert
witness to educate the jury about the psychology of police interro-
gations and the counter-intuitive phenomenon of police-induced
false confessions. Justice McCormack’s assistant pointed out, which
I could have figured out had I tried, that Justice McCormack was
not on the court at that time [laughter], but I don’t want to mince
any words. I’m disgusted by the poor quality of legal reasoning and
tendentious legal analysis by the Michigan Supreme Court in the
Kowalski case. And my experience working on cases in Detroit is
that the quality of the judging at the trial level can also be awful and
that the quality of the justice in Detroit, perhaps more generally in
Michigan, is not that much better in disputed confession cases.
None of this has anything to do with Justice McCormack [laugh-
ter]. Although one thing I want to say is that it’s nice to believe that
the United States has the best legal system in the world. But to
* Hamill Family Professor of Law and Psychology, University of San Francisco. A.B.,
University of California, Berkeley; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D. and Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley.
1. People v. Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 14, 32 (Mich. 2012).
2. See id. at 31–33 (asserting the misguided belief that the empirical psychological sci-
ence of false confessions is not sufficiently reliable to admit expert testimony on the subject,
despite the fact that social psychologists like me have routinely been allowed to testify in
hundreds of such cases across the United States in the last three decades).
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make that statement, you have to look at the United States and
other criminal justice systems comparatively, and there are a lot of
comparative scholars in law who’ve done that research and don’t
believe the United States has the best system in the world. We don’t
know how many innocent people have been wrongly convicted, and
we don’t know how well we can discover it, so we simply don’t know
the numbers. I’ll talk about that at some point. But it appears we
might have, arguably, the biggest wrongful conviction problem in
the world. So it’s possible in theory that we have the best legal sys-
tem in the world, but I’d want to see some evidence supporting that
statement, and looking at the wrongful conviction problem in
America—which has been so well documented by the National Reg-
istry of Exonerations housed here at the University of Michigan—I
don’t think such a statement is accurate.
I’m going to talk about false confession cases. I wanted to start
with two cases. The first is the case of Adrian Thomas. Some of you
may have heard of this case. This case was the subject of a movie.3
I’m going to show you the trailer too because it’s so brief and I
couldn’t get any clips from the interrogation.4 Adrian Thomas’s
three-year-old son Matthew was feverish, wheezing, and was exces-
sively crying.5 The wife found him one morning not breathing.
They took him to the emergency room.6 This is in Troy, New York.
A blood test was done there that showed he was in septic shock.7 He
was transferred to the Albany Medical Center, and a CAT scan
showed fluid collections in the brain. He was put on life support,
declared brain dead, and eventually died.8
The CAT scan did not show a skull fracture.9 But the emergency
room doctors told the police that the baby was murdered and that
there was a skull fracture.10 And the police ended up interrogating
Adrian Thomas for ten hours, not knowing how the baby died.
Their theory was that he had killed the baby; that he had thrown
the baby.11 The police detectives repeatedly lied to him about the
3. SCENES OF A CRIME (New Box Productions 2011).
4. SCENES OF A CRIME, Trailer, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0Fuyrh0eWA.
5. Brief for The Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae at 21, People v. Thomas, 8
N.E.3d 308 (N.Y. 2014) (No. 2012-00306) [hereinafter Brief for The Innocence Network].
6. Id. at 22.
7. See id; see also Maurice Possley, Adrian Thomas, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
casedetail.aspx?caseid=4449.
8. Brief for The Innocence Network, supra note 5, at 22.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 22–23.
11. Id.
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scientific evidence.12 They threatened him, they promised him he
could go home if he confessed.13 They threatened to arrest his wife.
Eventually, he did confess.14 As in the Kowalski case here in the
State of Michigan,15 he was convicted. The judge in Albany, New
York did not let a false confession expert testify. It wasn’t me, it was
my good colleague, now retired, UC-Berkeley Professor Richard Of-
she who was excluded.16 Mr. Thomas was convicted,17 despite the
fact that there was no medical evidence supporting that he killed
the baby. In fact, the autopsy never said that the baby died as a
result of homicide, and it was very clear that the baby died as a
result of sepsis. A very prominent physician testified that sepsis was
the likely cause of death.18 And then there was the local medical
emergency room doctor who testified that the child died of Shaken
Baby Syndrome.19
The highest New York court reversed the conviction.20 Adrian
Thomas was subsequently retried without the confession,21  and he
was acquitted at retrial.22 But of course there was great harm to
Adrian Thomas and his family. His wife divorced him, and he spent
six years in prison away from his five other children after his initial
conviction.23
Adrian Thomas endured a nine-hour interrogation over two ses-
sions.24 The police from the start believed he was responsible for
12. Id. at 26, 38.
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 63.
15. Lisa Roose-Church, Appeals Court Affirms Double Murder Conviction, Sentence, LIVING-
STON DAILY (Dec. 3, 2004), http://www.livingstondaily.com/story/news/crime/2014/12/03/
appeals-court-affirms-double-murder-conviction-sentence/19827185/.
16. People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 310 (N.Y. 2014); see also Brief for the New York City
Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 38–40, People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308 (N.Y. 2014) (No.
2012-00306).
17. Id. at 309 (2014).
18. See Adrian P. Thomas, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adrian_P._Thomas
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (“Chicago specialist Dr. Jan Leestma told the jury that the infant
died of septic shock due to a bacterial infection.”); see also Transcript of Record at 1970, New
York v. Thomas, No. 08-1074 (Troy Cty. Ct., Oct. 15, 2009).
19. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d at 310 (reviewing testimony the jury heard from the local emer-
gency room doctor that Matthew died from injuries caused by abusive head trauma, another
name for Shaken Baby Syndrome).
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id.
22. Possley, supra note 7.
23. See Police Tactics on Trial: Thomas Acquitted for Murder of Son, CRIMINALU.CO PRISON
NEWS (June 13, 2014), http://www.blog.criminalu.co/tag/adrian-thomas.
24. Brief for The Innocence Network, supra note 5, at 6, 23, 58.
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the death of his child.25 They believed it was caused by a skull frac-
ture or subdural hematoma.26 They got him to reenact the killing of
his child by throwing something against a crib.27 The kid died of
septic shock. It’s clear he was innocent. But the cops began with a
theory that he did it. They lied to him repeatedly about the alleged
scientific evidence, just making it up as they went along. They
promised him, they threatened him, and eventually they got a
confession.28
Nga Truong is the second case that I want to just briefly talk
about.29 At the time of her interrogation, she was two days short of
her seventeenth birthday.30 She had been a fifteen-year-old mother
in a poor Vietnamese household.31 The child had a history of
chronic respiratory problems, including asthma.32 When the child
was thirteen months old in November of 2008, he fell ill with strep
throat and bronchitis, was taken to the hospital, and was pro-
nounced dead.33
The autopsy never disclosed a cause of death. When the baby was
found, there was vomit all over him. He had a very high fever. Ap-
parently, one hour after the boy’s death, he still had a 101-degree
fever.34 There was no reason to believe that the baby was murdered,
but the police began with the theory that she had to have killed the
baby. Six years earlier, when Nga Truong was nine years old, her
mother had left her to watch a three-month old baby. That baby
(her mother’s baby) had died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.35
So the police had assumed she had killed her mother’s baby. There
was never an investigation into the death of her mother’s baby—
and the police assumed that she must have therefore have also
killed her own baby. Police assumed the mechanism of the prior
SIDS death (i.e., her mother’s baby) must have been suffocation,
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 44.
28. See id. at 40–45.
29. See generally WBUR, Anatomy of a Bad Confession—Excerpt 3, YOUTUBE (Dec. 6, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-E4CMX07Y0 (showing excerpt of interrogation of Nga
Truong).
30. David Boeri, How a Teen’s Coerced Confession Set Her Free, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 30,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489360/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-set-her-
free; see also Julian Seltzer & Amanda Jane Stern, Coerced: A Documentary Play, BRANDEIS UNIV.,
AM. STUDIES PROGRAM, https://www.brandeis.edu/programs/american-studies/coerced.html
(last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
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even though there was no evidence that the baby died of
suffocation.
As a result, the police interrogated her for only two-and-a-half
hours. The whole thing is on tape, like the Adrian Thomas case,
which is the reason why I began with these two cases. Most are not
on tape. They yelled at her. They accused her of lying. They lied at
every turn about what the alleged scientific evidence showed—the
autopsy, the doctors, and telling her repeatedly that it showed that
she did it.36 They gave her two choices: she could either go home
and be charged as a juvenile and go through the juvenile system,
which wouldn’t punish her, but would instead take her and her
brothers out of the home, a very poor home, and put them in a
better foster care system, or she could be charged as an adult, and
they would have to go to court and show that she never cooperated,
that she was lying, and she would be punished.37
I began with these two examples just to give some context. I’m
sure Dr. Barnes sees this all the time, this rush to judgment when
there are ambiguous injuries or a death to a child. And the police
officers either assume the child must have been murdered or be-
lieve a flawed emergency room speculation that sometimes, as in
Adrian Thomas’s case, was contradicted by the evidence—there was
no skull fracture—must be the truth and setting out to prove it, and
they use coercive interrogation techniques to do so.
Here I want to talk first about false confessions. This is a phe-
nomenon that’s been well studied. The modern science of false
confessions begins about thirty, thirty-five years ago.38 The actual
empirical study goes back over a century.39 There are multiple types
of data. I tend to work with real-world data, with actual cases. As a
scientist or social scientist knows, there’s no such thing as perfect
data. All data has strengths and weaknesses. The kind of data I work
with tends to have internal validity problems. We can’t parse out
causation, we can’t control our variables—though we can, with
good statistical data, do good statistical analysis. Laboratory data—
particularly in this area where we can’t recreate ten-hour interroga-
tions where people are accused of murder and lied to and
threatened—has what’s called external validity problems. But you
get convergent validity when multiple methods that have different
limitations converge on the same findings.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Saul Kassin & Lawrence Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67–94 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightman eds., 1985).
39. See HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME
(1908).
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In what I do, I focus on individual case studies. There are lots of
them—books written about false confessions, including one I’ve
written.40 Many of these cases reveal multiple false confessions. Per-
haps some of you have seen the Central Park Jogger movie. You
know, if you are of a certain age, those of us who lived though it
(and it looks like most of the people in this room are of a certain
age, right?). This was the trial of the century. We all assumed that
the young men charged in the Central Park jogger rape case were
guilty, and it turned out they falsely confessed and were coerced
into doing so.41 And many others happen, many others in multiple
false confession cases.
I don’t just look at individual cases; I also look at aggregated
cases. These were a couple of the studies that I’ve done. There’s
one in progress that I can’t seem to finish. We’ve got two hundred
proven false confessions. That’s about two hundred total in which
we found false confessions that are absolutely proven false.42 That
is, nobody would dispute them, where no crime occurred, or where
it was physically impossible for the person to have committed the
crime, where there’s scientific evidence that exculpates conclu-
sively, or where the true perpetrator is identified. Sometimes,
there’s more than one of these. They’re not mutually exclusive.
The idea is that no one can say, “This person might have done it,”
because we can prove to a near certainty, if not absolute certainty in
many of these cases, that the confession is false. These are very con-
servative criteria, and it limits the cases we can talk about.
Another source of data are the DNA exonerations, which are very
well known.43 But this dataset, of course, has a selection bias in that
these are only cases in which DNA evidence is available (and there
are others here more qualified here to talk about those selection
biases than I am). But we’ve learned a great deal about false confes-
sions and other sources of wrongful conviction from this dataset.
One of my favorite people on the planet who is here, Sam Gross,
started with Rob Warden, the National Registry of Exonerations,
which is housed here at the University of Michigan Law School.44 It
is one of the reasons I said it was a privilege to be talking to you.
40. See, e.g., TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE CONFES-
SIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).
41. Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to Settle Suit for $40
Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/nyregion/5-ex-
onerated-in-central-park-jogger-case-are-to-settle-suit-for-40-million.html?r=0.
42. Richard A. Leo, Steven Drizin, Gillian Emmerich & Amy Shlosberg, Analyzing Proven
False Confessions (forthcoming) (cases on file with authors).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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The DNA cases consistently show fifteen to twenty-five percent false
confessions.45 I think the number is really closer to fifteen per-
cent.46 I think they over-count because they count each defendant
in cases in which there’s a false confession about the same crime,
even if not every defendant made a false confession. So if there are
four defendants and two falsely confessed and they were all exoner-
ated, exculpated, by DNA, the National Registry of Exonerations
counts all four as false confessions. I would just count the two.
The National Registry of Exonerations, which looks at a broader
swath of cases, has about a thirteen percent false confession rate, if
you look at those cases.47 This database is ever-growing, and I’m a
little bit nervous talking about it with Sam Gross, the world’s expert,
in the room. So I merely make this point: to begin with the data,
and what the sources of the data are for the comments that I’m
going to make in my time.
Now, as Sam and many others would say, these cases are un-
doubtedly the tip of the iceberg. We don’t know how frequent or
common false confessions are, much less wrongful convictions.
We’re studying a phenomenon that is largely invisible. And so we
don’t know. It could be one percent of interrogations lead to false
confessions; it could be ten percent; it could be more. We don’t
know what percentage of the false confessions lead to wrongful
convictions.
I did want to talk about the impact of confession evidence.
There’s every reason to believe that when you have a false confes-
sion, you’re likely to get a wrongful conviction, particularly if the
case goes to trial. Nga Truong’s case didn’t go to trial.48 She was in
jail for two-and-a-half years, and her confession was ultimately sup-
pressed and thrown out49 as a Miranda violation, as a voluntariness
violation, as a violation of a rule in Massachusetts that when a juve-
nile is interrogated in custody, the juvenile must have a meaningful
opportunity to consult with an adult before agreeing to partici-
pate.50 It never got into the stream of evidence that led to a trial. It
45. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera-
tion/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); see also INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/latest/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
46. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 244 (2008); see
also BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 18 (2011).
47. See LEO, supra note 46, at 244; see also GARRETT, supra note 46, at 18.
48. Boeri, supra note 30.
49. Id.
50. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 28 N.E.3d 385, 389–90 (Mass. 2015) (extending “inter-
ested adult” rule to apply to seventeen-year-olds, which requires that juveniles be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to consult with an “interested adult” before waiving his or her Mi-
randa rights).
700 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:3
was weeded out. I emphasize this because there’s also some data to
show that many false confession cases do get weeded out. The prob-
lem is when they get into the stream of evidence, as occurred in the
Adrian Thomas case. Thomas was convicted despite the fact that
there was a ten-hour recorded interrogation for the jury to see,
which was highly coercive. He was threatened, promised, repeatedly
lied to, including told that he could go home.51 The world’s expert
from Harvard on sepsis said this baby clearly died of septic shock.
There was no evidence of a skull fracture.52 Yet he had confessed to
it.53 The CAT scan clearly showed there was no skull fracture.54
When the confession was used against him, he was convicted.55
When the New York court reversed the conviction, and he was tried
again without the confession, he was acquitted.56
Confessions are highly prejudicial when they are introduced.
These are some survey studies showing what the law has known for
centuries—that when people hear somebody has confessed, they as-
sume they’re guilty.57 The real trial is what occurs in the
interrogation room. One of these studies is of real jurors that I did
with some colleagues in southern California.58 Real jurors have no
idea about the scientific literature on interrogation and confes-
sions. The subject of police interrogation and false confessions is
beyond common knowledge and highly counter-intuitive.59 Police
51. Brief for The Innocence Network, supra note 5, at 40–45.
52. Id. at 22.
53. People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 309 (N.Y. 2014).
54. Brief for The Innocence Network, supra note 5, at 22.
55. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d at 309.
56. Possley, supra note 7.
57. See Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Katheryn Sperry & Richard Leo, Jurors Believe Interrogation
Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False Confessions: Will Expert Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?, 17
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 239, 244, 247 (2011) (finding that most jurors believed coercive inter-
rogation tactics would likely elicit confessions from guilty, but not innocent suspects); see
Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What Do Potential Jurors Know about Police Interrogation Tech-
niques and False Confessions?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 381, 388–90 (2009) (finding that survey
participants believed that coercive interview techniques are not likely to elicit false confes-
sions). In addition to these studies, see generally Danielle Chojnacki, Michael Cicchini &
Lawrence White, An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2008); Linda Henkel, Kimberly Coffman & Elizabeth Dailey, A Survey of Peo-
ple’s Attitudes and Beliefs About False Confessions, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 555 (2008); Mark Costanzo,
Netta Shaked-Schroer & Katherine Vinson, Juror Beliefs About Police Interrogation, False Confes-
sion, and Expert Testimony, 7 J. LEGAL EMPIRICAL STUD. 231 (2010).
58. See generally Blandon-Gitlin, Sperry & Leo, supra note 57 (surveying 126 jurors from
Orange County, California on their perceptions about interrogation tactics and expert testi-
mony on confessions).
59. See Chojnacki, Cicchini & White, supra note 57; see also Leo & Liu, supra note 57;
Henkel, Coffman & Dailey, supra note 57; Blandon-Gitlin, Sperry & Leo, supra note 57; see
generally Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer & Vinson, supra note 57.
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detectives receive specialized training in psychological interroga-
tion techniques; most people do not know what these techniques
are or how the techniques are designed to work (i.e., move a sus-
pect from denial to admission). In addition, most people also do
not know what psychological coercion is, why some techniques are
regarded as psychologically coercive, and what their likely effects
are. Moreover, most people do not know which interrogation tech-
niques create a risk of eliciting false confessions or how and why the
psychological process of police interrogation can, and sometimes
does, lead suspects to falsely confess. This unfamiliarity causes most
people to assume that virtually all confessions are true.
So one of the things—and I hadn’t planned to talk this way, but
this is extemporaneous—one of the things that the Michigan Su-
preme Court would have noticed if it paid any attention to the
actual empirical scientific literature on false confessions, is that ac-
tual jurors think that police can be human lie detectors, that when
they think somebody is lying, they usually get it right, eighty, eighty-
five percent of the time.60 The scientific, the psychological litera-
ture very clearly shows they get it right about fifty-five percent of the
time, like most people do, that there are high rates of error.61 But
there are other things in this literature about misconceptions and
myths that influence the highly prejudicial impact of confession,
including false and coerced confession evidence when put before a
jury.
When making the argument that confessions are highly prejudi-
cial, we rely both on laboratory studies and field studies. Many
psychologists—most noteworthy Saul Kassin62 of John Jay College of
Criminal Justice—have done experimental studies, showing that
when mock jurors evaluate confession evidence, they rate it more
highly or more impactful than other types of evidence. This finding
holds even when the confession evidence is coerced, even when
they’re instructed to disregard it, even when it’s contradicted by
other types of case evidence, and is not highly probative. A second
line of research involves the aggregated case studies of false confes-
sions that I mentioned earlier. In these studies, we have looked at,
among other things, the case outcomes when innocent individuals
falsely confess. In these studies, about half of the cases have gone to
trial, and the other half were weeded out prior to trial. In the half
60. See generally Saul M. Kassin et al., Police–Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommen-
dations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010).
61. See id at 6.
62. See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 1
POL. INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 112, 117 (2014) (summarizing studies about how
jurors evaluate confession evidence).
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of the cases that went to trial, we have numbers showing the per-
centage who were convicted. Three out of four63 to four out of five64
to nine out of ten65 of these individuals were wrongly convicted—
many of them, their cases reversed when the DNA showed they
were innocent or exonerated through other means. These figures
are surprising, since in all of these cases the defendants were factu-
ally innocent, the confession was factually false, the confessions
were contradicted by other case evidence and only illusorily sup-
ported, if at all, by ambiguous or misleading circumstantial
evidence, and the defendants had typically alleged that they were
made to confess falsely after a psychologically coercive interroga-
tion process. But, unlike the Thomas and Truong cases discussed
early, virtually all of the interrogations that produced these factually
false confessions were not electronically recorded.
There is a biasing effect of confession evidence—whether it’s
false or not—at every stage of the process, including in post-convic-
tion. I have some more specific data that I’m going to very briefly
mention on the aggregated case studies. The biggest one to date is
one I’ve done with Steve Drizin. Many of these false confessions also
lead to false plea bargains, which is not surprising. In this study,
eighty-one percent of the false confessors who went to trial were
erroneously convicted—four out of five.66 But when you add the
plea bargains in, it means eighty-five percent of the people whose
cases were not dismissed pre-trial ended up being convicted.67 I
mentioned earlier that Steven Drizin and Gillian Emmerich and I
have a study of 200 proven false confessions.68 To date, we’ve coded
168 of them; we’re not done. But what these numbers show is that
ninety-three percent so far of those whose cases went to trial were
convicted.69 Again, these are proven false confessions. These aren’t,
“We think they’re innocent.” These are, “We can affirmatively
63. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depriva-
tions of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 483 (1998) (finding that in a study of sixty false confessions, seventy-three
percent of the false confessions resulted in convictions).
64. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 960 (finding that in a study of 125 “proven false confessions” that
eighty-one percent resulted in jury convictions).
65. See Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 495 n.65
(finding that in a study of 460 convictions and “near misses,” 110 of which involved false
confessions, eighty-eight percent resulted in wrongful convictions).
66. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 64, at 960.
67. See id. at 961.
68. Leo et al., supra note 42; Richard Leo, Powerpoint Presentation at the University of
Michigan Law School: Child Abuse Evidence: Perspectives from Law, Medicine, Psychology,
and Statistics (Nov. 6, 2015) (on file with the UNIV. MICH. J.L. REFORM).
69. Leo et al., supra note 42; Leo, Powerpoint Presentation, supra note 68.
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prove, you know, that the murder victim showed up alive,” although
that typically doesn’t lead to a conviction. But there are cases like
that in our dataset. More common is the baby really died through
other means, physical impossibility—somebody’s at another place
and it can be documented at the time of the crime, the DNA excul-
pations, and the true perpetrator cases. When you add the plea
bargains in this dataset, which so far are slightly higher, you get
ninety-five percent of the cases that aren’t weeded out leading to
conviction.70
I want to now discuss the social psychology of police interroga-
tion and risk factors for false confession. Police interrogation is a
cumulative, structured, and time-sequenced process in which detec-
tives draw on an arsenal of psychological techniques in order to
overcome a suspect’s denials and elicit incriminating statements,
admissions, and/or confessions. This is the sole purpose of custo-
dial interrogation. To achieve this purpose, interrogators use
techniques that seek to influence, persuade, manipulate, and
deceive suspects into believing that their situation is hopeless and
that their best interest lies in confessing.71 Sometimes, however, in-
terrogators cross the line and employ techniques and methods of
interrogation that are coercive and increase the likelihood of elicit-
ing unreliable confessions or statements.
Contemporary American interrogation methods are structured
to persuade a rational guilty person who knows he is guilty to re-
think his initial decision to deny culpability and choose instead to
confess. Police interrogators know that it is not in any suspect’s ra-
tional self-interest to confess. They expect to encounter resistance
and denials to their allegations, and they know that they must apply
a certain amount of interpersonal pressure and persuasion to con-
vince a reluctant suspect to confess. As a result, interrogators have,
over the years, developed a set of subtle and sophisticated interro-
gation techniques whose purpose is to alter a guilty suspect’s
perceptions so that he will see the act of confessing as being in his
self-interest.
These interrogation techniques were developed for the purpose
of inducing guilty individuals to confess to their crimes, and police
are admonished in their training to use them only on suspects be-
lieved to be guilty.72 When these same techniques are used on
70. Leo et al., supra note 42; Leo, Powerpoint Presentation, supra note 68.
71. See generally Deborah Davis & William O’Donohue, The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influ-
ence Tactics in the Interrogation Room, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 897–996 (William
O’Donohue ed., 2004).
72. See FRED INBAU, JOHN REID, JOSEPH BUCKLEY & BRIAN JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 187 (5th ed. 2013) (“These nine steps are presented in the context of the
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innocent suspects, they carry a heightened risk that they will elicit
false statements, admissions, and/or confessions.
The goal of an interrogator is to persuade a suspect to view his
immediate situation differently by focusing the suspect’s attention
on a limited set of choices and alternatives, and by convincing him
of the likely consequences that attach to each of these choices.73
The process often unfolds in two steps: first, the interrogator causes
the suspect to view his situation as hopeless; and, second, the inter-
rogator persuades the suspect that only by confessing will the
suspect be able to improve his otherwise hopeless situation.74 The
interrogator makes it clear what information he is seeking and at-
tempts to convince the suspect that his only rational option is to
confirm the information the interrogator purports to already know.
The first step or stage of an interrogation consists of causing a
suspect to view his situation as hopeless.75 If the interrogator is suc-
cessful at this stage, he will undermine the suspect’s self-confidence
and cause the suspect to reason that there is no way to escape the
interrogation without incriminating himself. To accomplish this, in-
terrogators accuse the suspect of having committed the crime; they
attack and try to undermine a suspect’s assertion of an alibi, alter-
nate sequence of events, or verbalization of innocence (pointing
out or inventing logical and factual inconsistencies, implausibilities,
and/or impossibilities); they exude unwavering confidence in their
assertions of the suspect’s and his accomplices’ guilt; they refuse to
accept the possibility of the suspect’s denials; and, most impor-
tantly, they confront the suspect with incontrovertible evidence of
his guilt, whether real or non-existent. Because interrogation is a
cumulative and time-sequenced process, interrogators often draw
on these techniques repeatedly and/or in succession, building on
their earlier accusations, challenges and representations at each
step in the interrogation process.76
Through the use of these techniques, the interrogator communi-
cates to the suspect that he has been caught, that there is no way he
will escape the interrogation without incriminating himself and
interrogation of suspects whose guilt seems definite or reasonably certain.”). For empirical
support for this observation, see generally LEO, supra note 46.
73. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 985 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, The
Decision to Confess Falsely]; LEO, supra note 46, at 119–64.
74. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 985; LEO, supra note
46, at 119–64.
75. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 985; LEO, supra note
46, at 119–64.
76. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 985; LEO, supra note
46, at 119–64.
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other suspects, and that his future is determined—that regardless
of the suspect’s denials or protestations of innocence, he is going to
be arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. The interrogator
seeks to convince the suspect that this is a fact that has been estab-
lished beyond any doubt, and thus that any objective person must
necessarily reason to this conclusion.77 By persuading the suspect
that he has been caught, that the existing evidence or case facts
objectively prove his guilt, and that it is only a matter of time before
he will be prosecuted and convicted, the interrogator seeks to alter
the suspect’s perceptions, such that he comes to view his situation
as hopeless and to perceive that resisting the interrogator’s de-
mands is futile.78
Once the interrogator has caused the suspect to understand that
he has been caught and that there is no way out of this predica-
ment, the interrogator seeks to convince the suspect that the only
way to improve his otherwise hopeless situation is by confessing to
the offense(s) of which he is accused and confirming the informa-
tion the interrogator is seeking to extract from the suspect.79 The
second step of the interrogation thus consists of offering the sus-
pect inducements to confess—reasons or scenarios that suggest the
suspect will receive some personal, moral, communal, procedural,
material, legal or other benefit if he confesses to the interrogator’s
version of the offense.80 One goal of these scenarios or induce-
ments is to downplay both the seriousness of the alleged crime as
well as the consequences of confessing, leading the suspect to per-
ceive that the consequences of continuing to deny the accusations
will be worse than the consequences of admitting to participation
in the crime. The interrogator’s attempt to diminish the suspect’s
perception of the consequences of confessing is combined with
techniques that are designed to increase the suspect’s anxiety in
order to create the perceived need for release from the stress of
prolonged interrogation.81 Investigators also use scenarios to plant
77. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 985; LEO, supra note
46, at 119–64.
78. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1041, 1045; see LEO, supra
note 46, at 119–64.
79. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1051; see LEO, supra note
46, at 119–64.
80. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1056–57, 1060–61; see
LEO, supra note 46, at 119–64.
81. See Brian Jayne, The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation, in CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed., 1986) (“The goal of interrogation is therefore to
decrease the suspect’s perception of the consequences of confessing, while at the same time
increasing the suspect’s internal anxiety associated with his deception.”).
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ideas or suggestions about how or why the suspect may have com-
mitted the crime which they may later pressure the suspect to
accept and repeat.
Researchers have classified the types of inducements investiga-
tors use during the second step of interrogation into three
categories: low-end inducements, systemic inducements, and high-end
inducements.82
Low-end inducements refer to interpersonal or moral appeals the
interrogator uses to convince a suspect that he will feel better if he
confesses. For example, an interrogator may tell a suspect that the
truth will set him free if he confesses, that confessing will relieve his
anxiety or guilt, that confessing is the moral or Christian thing to
do, or that confessing will improve his standing in the eyes of the
victim or the eyes of the community.
Systemic inducements refer to appeals that the interrogator uses
to focus the suspect’s attention on the processes and outcomes of
the criminal justice system in order to get the suspect to come to
the conclusion that his case is likely to be processed more favorably
by all actors in the criminal justice system if he confesses. For exam-
ple, an interrogator may tell a suspect that he is the suspect’s ally
and will try to help him out—both in his discussions with the prose-
cutor as well as in his role as a professional witness at trial—but can
only do so if the suspect first admits his guilt. Or the interrogator
may ask the suspect how he expects the prosecutor to look favorably
on the suspect’s case if the suspect does not cooperate with authori-
ties. Or the interrogator may ask the suspect what a judge and jury
are really going to think, and how they are likely to react, if he does
not demonstrate remorse and admit his guilt to authorities. Interro-
gators often couple the use of systemic incentives with the assertion
that this is the suspect’s one and only chance—now or never—to
tell his side of the story;83 if he passes up this opportunity, all the
relevant actors in the system (police, prosecutor, judge, and jury)
will no longer be open to the possibility of viewing his actions in
their most favorable light. This tactic may incentivize a suspect to
either falsely confess or confirm an incorrect story for the interro-
gator based on the belief that the suspect will not have the same
opportunity to help himself again in the future. Interrogators rely
on systemic inducements to persuade the suspect to reason to the
conclusion that the justice system naturally confers rewards for
82. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1056, 1060, 1077; see
LEO, supra note 46, at 119–64.
83. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1060–61, 1064; see LEO,
supra note 46, at 119–64.
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those who admit guilt, demonstrate remorse, and cooperate with
authorities, whereas it inevitably metes out punishment for those
who do not.
Finally, high-end inducements refer to appeals that directly com-
municate the message that the suspect will receive less punishment,
a lower prison sentence and/or some form of police, prosecutorial,
judicial, or juror leniency and/or immunity if he complies with the
interrogator’s demand that he confess, but that the suspect will re-
ceive a higher sentence or greater punishment if he does not
comply with the interrogator’s demand that he confess.84 High-end
inducements may either be implicit or explicit: the important ques-
tion is whether the interrogation technique communicates the
message, or is understood to communicate the message, that the
suspect will receive a lower (or no) criminal charge and/or lesser
(or no) punishment if he confesses as opposed to a higher criminal
charge and/or greater amount of punishment if he does not. For
example, if police interrogators lead a suspect to believe he will be
able to go home and not be charged with a homicide if he confesses
to witnessing the crime and fingering someone else as the trigger-
man, this would be a high-end inducement because it communicates
immunity in exchange for making such a statement.85
Explicit high-end incentives can include telling a suspect that
there are several degrees of the alleged offense, each of which carry
different amounts of punishment, and asking the suspect which ver-
sion he would like to confess to. Or the interrogator may explicitly
tell the suspect that he will receive a long prison sentence—or per-
haps even the death penalty—if he does not confess to the
interrogator’s version of events. The interrogator may also point
out what happens to men of the suspect’s age, or men accused of
crime, in prison if the suspect does not confess to the interrogator’s
minimized account. Sometimes interrogators who rely on high-end
inducements will present the suspect with a simple two-choice situa-
tion (good vs. bad): if the suspect agrees to the good choice (a
minimized version of the offense, such as involuntary manslaughter
or self-defense, or the implication of another person), he will re-
ceive a lower amount of punishment or no punishment at all; but if
he does not confess right then, criminal justice officials will impute
to him the bad choice (a maximized version of the offense, such as
pre-meditated first degree murder, or that the suspect was acting
84. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1077; see LEO, supra note
46, at 155–62.
85. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1103; see LEO, supra note
46, at 155–62.
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alone), and he will receive a higher level of punishment, or perhaps
the harshest possible punishment.86 The purpose of high-end in-
ducements is to communicate to a suspect that it is in his rational
self-interest to confess to the minimized or less-incriminating ver-
sion of events that the interrogator is suggesting because if the
suspect does so, he will receive a lower charge, a lesser amount of
punishment and/or no time in prison.87 If he fails to do so, he will
receive a higher charge, a greater amount of punishment and more
time in prison, perhaps even the death penalty.
To evaluate whether a particular interrogation was psychologi-
cally coercive, an expert must evaluate the interrogator’s
techniques, methods, and strategies in the light of the generally ac-
cepted findings of the social science research literature on the
subjects of interrogation, coercive influence techniques, and
confessions.88
Social science research has repeatedly demonstrated that some
systemic inducements (depending on the content of the induce-
ment, how explicitly or vaguely it is stated, and the message that it
communicates) and all high-end inducements are coercive because
they rely on implicit and/or explicit promises of leniency and
threats of harm to induce compliance. Systemic and high-end induce-
ments increase the likelihood of eliciting false confessions and false
statements from suspects because of the quid pro quo arrangement
and the benefit a suspect expects to receive in exchange for the
information the interrogator is seeking, regardless of whether the
suspect knows that information to be true or not. Such promises of
leniency and threats of harm are regarded as coercive in the social
science literature because of the messages they convey and their
demonstrated impact on the decision-making of individuals. The
expert may also evaluate whether the interrogation techniques, ei-
ther individually or cumulatively, had the effect of causing a suspect
to perceive that he had no choice but to comply with the demands
of the interrogator, and thus, the interrogation, in effect, overbore
the suspect’s will.89
86. This technique is sometimes referred to in the academic literature as the maximiza-
tion/minimization technique. See Kassin et al, supra note 60, at 12; LEO, supra note 46, at
155–62.
87. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 1089; see LEO, supra note
46, at 155–62.
88. See LEO, supra note 46, at 314–16 (discussing social science expert testimony on in-
terrogations and confessions); see also Keith Findley, Brian Cutler & Danielle Loney, Expert
Testimony on Interrogation and False Confessions, 82 UMKC L. REV. 589 (2014).
89. Id.
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False confessions and false statements, of course, will occur in
response to traditionally-coercive methods of interrogation such as
the use of physical violence, threats of immediate physical harm,
excessively long or incommunicado interrogation, or deprivation of
essential necessities such as food, water, and/or sleep. However,
these types of traditionally coercive techniques no longer appear to
be common in the United States.90 The psychological techniques of
interrogation that cross the line and sometimes cause false confes-
sions typically involve one of two patterns: (1) the interrogator
communicates to the suspect, implicitly or explicitly, that he will
receive a higher charge and harsher sentence or punishment if he
does not provide a satisfactory statement, but that he will receive a
lesser charge or sentence, or perhaps no charge or punishment at
all, if he does; or (2) the interrogator wears down and distresses the
suspect to the point that the suspect subjectively feels that he has no
choice but to comply with the interrogator’s demands if he is to put
an end to the intolerable stress of continued interrogation and/or
escape the oppressive interrogation environment. As will be dis-
cussed later, some individuals have a greater vulnerability to
making false confessions both because of their individual character-
istics (e.g., juveniles, the mentally handicapped, etc.) or because of
certain interrogation techniques (e.g., being promised freedom
and immunity in exchange for admitting to witnessing a crime).
Whether a police-induced false confession or statement is caused
primarily by coercive interrogation techniques or by a suspect’s pre-
existing vulnerabilities to interrogation, or some combination of
both, there are three fundamental types of false confessions and
statements: a voluntary false confession or statement (i.e., a false
confession knowingly given in response to little or no police pres-
sure); a coerced or stress-compliant false confession or statement (i.e.,
a false confession knowingly given to put an end to the interroga-
tion or to receive an anticipated benefit or reward in exchange for
confession); and a coerced or non-coerced-persuaded false confession or
statement (i.e., a confession given by a suspect who comes to doubt
the reliability of his memory and thus comes to believe that he may
have committed the crime, despite no actual memory of having
done so).91 These different types of false confession typically involve
90. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73, at 983; see LEO, supra note
46, at 75–77.
91. See Richard Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The
Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 189, 207–08
(1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology of Police Interrogations].
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different levels of police pressure, a different psychology of influ-
ence and decision-making, and different beliefs about the
likelihood of one’s guilt. Regardless of type, false confessors typi-
cally recant their confessions shortly after they are removed from
the pressures and reinforcements of the interrogation
environment.
As the social science research has indicated, there are numerous
“situational” risk factors for police interrogation-induced false con-
fession. These include:
1) Presumption of Guilt, Presumption of Guilty Knowledge, and Inves-
tigative Bias.92 Substantial social science research has demonstrated
that a behavioral presumption of guilt leads to tunnel vision, confir-
mation bias, and investigative bias among police investigators, who,
as a result, often end up eliciting unreliable case information.93
When investigators begin with or arrive at a premature presump-
tion of guilt, they seek to build a case against an individual whose
guilt they assume a fortiori—rather than seeking to even-handedly
collect factual information and objectively investigate a case. Under
these circumstances, investigators act as if they are seeking to prove
their pre-existing theories or conclusions rather than investigate a
hypothesis. This mental framework causes investigators to disregard
contradictory information and evidence, selectively mischaracterize
existing information and evidence, misinterpret a suspect’s state-
ments and behavior to conform to the investigators’ pre-existing
assumptions, and to more aggressively interrogate suspects whose
guilt they presume.94 Most significantly, social science research has
demonstrated that investigators’ pre-existing presumption of guilt
puts innocent suspects at an elevated risk of making or agreeing to
a false statement, admission, or confession in order to satisfy over-
zealous investigators and put an end to the accusatory pressures of
sustained police interrogation.95
2) Lengthy Interrogation and Sleep Deprivation. Lengthy interroga-
tion/custody and sleep deprivation are two related situational risk
factors for making or agreeing to a false confession during police
92. See Saul Kassin, Christine Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral Confirmation in the
Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 198 (2003);
Carole Hill et al., The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect Interviews: A Systematic Evaluation, 13
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357 (2008); Fadia Narchet, Christian Meissner & Melissa
Russano, Modeling the Influence of Investigator Bias on the Elicitation of True and False Confessions,
35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 452, 452 (2011).
93. See generally CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOTT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY
ME) (2007).
94. See Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, supra note 92, at 199.
95. See Kassin et al., supra note 60, at 6, 16.
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interrogation.96 Empirical studies indicate that the overwhelming
majority of routine custodial interrogations last less than one
hour,97 whereas the combined time period of custody and interro-
gation in most interrogations leading to a false confession is more
than six hours.98 The Reid and Associates police interrogation train-
ing manual specifically recommends that police interrogate for no
longer than four hours absent “exceptional situations” and that
“most cases require considerably fewer than four hours.”99 Lengthy
detention and interrogation is a significant risk factor for false con-
fessions because the longer an interrogation lasts, the more likely
the suspect is to become fatigued and depleted of the physical and
psychological resources necessary to resist the pressures and stresses
of accusatory interrogation,100 especially where investigators use
physically or psychologically coercive methods.101 It can also lead to
sleep deprivation, which, as mentioned earlier, heightens interroga-
tive suggestibility by impairing decision-making abilities, such as the
ability to anticipate risks and consequences, inhibit behavioral im-
pulses and resist suggestive questioning.102 The longer an
interrogation lasts, the more pressure investigators bring to bear on
the suspect and the more techniques and strategies they may use to
move the suspect from denial to admission. Researchers consider
the length of an interrogation to include both the time that a sus-
pect is being questioned and/or accused as well as any breaks
between questioning/accusation sessions because breaks between
accusation and questioning add to the stress and fatigue of the in-
terrogation and sometimes is used as an interrogation technique
itself.
3) False evidence ploys. Police interrogators routinely tell criminal
suspects that the evidence establishes their guilt: if police possess
real evidence, this is called a true evidence ploy. If police are mak-
ing up, lying about, or exaggerating non-existent evidence, this is
called a false evidence ploy. The social science research literature
96. See id. at 6.
97. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 302
1995–1996); see also BARRY FELD, KIDS, COPS AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION
ROOM 156 (2013).
98. Drizin & Leo, supra note 64, at 948.
99. FRED INBAU, JOHN REID, JOSEPH BUCKLEY & BRIAN JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 597 (4th ed. 2001).
100. Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, Interrogation-Related Regulatory Decline: Ego-Depletion,
Failures of Self-Regulation and the Decision to Confess, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L., 673 (2012).
101. See Kassin et al., supra note 60.
102. See Mark Blagrove, Effects of Length of Sleep Deprivation on Interrogative Suggestibility, J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 2, 48 (1996); see also Stephen Frenda et al., Sleep Deprivation and False
Confessions, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2047 (2016).
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has demonstrated that false evidence ploys are virtually always pre-
sent in, and substantially likely to increase, the risk of eliciting false
statements, admissions, and/or confessions. False evidence ploys
are among the most well-documented situational risk factors for
eliciting false and unreliable statements, admissions, and/or confes-
sions, as described in the social science research literature.103 Many
people do not know that police detectives can legally lie by pretend-
ing to have incriminating evidence that does not exist, is fabricated,
or is exaggerated; even those who suspect that the police may be
bluffing about the evidence are likely to fear that police will manip-
ulate evidence to prosecute them. The use of false evidence ploys
can create or contribute to the suspect’s perception that he or she
is trapped, there is no way out, and/or that his conviction will be
inevitable, thus leading to the perception that he or she is in a
hopeless situation and has little choice but to agree to or negotiate
the best available outcome or mitigation of punishment given the
perceived, subjective reality of the suspect’s situation.
As a century of basic psychological research on misinformation
effects has shown104 (as well as decades of psychological research on
police lying to suspects during interrogation105), false evidence
ploys are effective at eliciting compliance,106 confusing some sus-
pects into believing that they have been framed or that such
evidence really does exist,107 causing some suspects to doubt them-
selves (deferring to interrogators’ authoritative assertions of
irrefutable evidence despite knowing they did not commit a
crime),108 and even causing some suspects to develop false beliefs
and/or memories of committing crimes.109 Based on well-estab-
lished basic and applied social scientific research going back
decades, the multiple general and specific false evidence ploys that
the investigators used in their interrogations of Adrian Thomas sig-
nificantly increased the risk of eliciting a false and unreliable
103. See Kassin et al, supra note 60, at 17.
104. Elizabeth Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30 Year Investigation of
the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361 (2005).
105. Kassin et al., supra note 60, at 28–29.
106. See LEO, supra note 46, at 147, 191–92.
107. Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology of Police Interrogation, supra note 91, at 200–03.
108. Id.
109. See LEO, supra note 46, at 210–25 (discussing persuaded false confessions); see also
Julia Shaw & Don Read, Constructing Rich False Memories of Committing Crime, 26 PSYCHOL. SCI.
291, 291–301 (2015), http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/01/14/0956797614562
862.full.pdf+html; cf. Deborah Wright, Kimberly Wade & Derrick Watson, Delay and Déjà Vu:
Timing and Repetition Increase the Power of False Evidence, 20 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. 812
(2013).
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confession from him, especially the longer his interrogation lasted
and the more sleep deprived and frightened he became.
4) Minimization and maximization. A common interrogation
strategy is for investigators to portray the offense in a way that mini-
mizes its moral, psychological, and/or legal seriousness, thus
lowering the perceived cost of confessing by communicating that
the consequences of confessing will not be that serious. Interroga-
tion techniques and strategies that minimize the legal seriousness
of the crime, in particular, are associated with and known to in-
crease the risk of eliciting false confessions. Such minimization
strategies can imply leniency, reduced punishment, or even no pun-
ishment at all if the suspect perceives that there is no consequence
to confessing (i.e., either that the act to which the suspect is con-
fessing is not a crime or that it carries little or no penalty).110
Conversely, interrogation techniques and strategies that maximize
the legal seriousness of the crime—i.e., suggest that the suspect will
face a bad or perhaps the worst possible outcome if he or she does
not make or agree to an incriminating statement—are also associ-
ated with and known to increase the risk of eliciting false
confessions. Such maximization strategies can imply harsher treat-
ment, confinement, punishment, sentencing and/or other negative
outcomes if the suspect fails to comply and confess.
5) Explicit Promises and Threats. The use of explicit promises of
leniency, immunity and/or a tangible benefit, as well as the use of
explicit threats of harm, significantly increases the risk of eliciting
an involuntary false statement, admission, and/or confession when
applied to the innocent. Indeed, as empirical social science re-
search has repeatedly demonstrated, promises of leniency—like
threats of harm or harsher punishment and whether explicit or im-
plicit—are widely associated with police-induced false confession in
the modern era and are believed to be among the leading causes.
Promises and threats (whether implied or express) are inherently
coercive because they exert substantial pressure on a suspect to
comply and thus can easily overbear the will or ability of a suspect
to resist an interrogator’s demands or requests. Like other high-end
inducements, promises and threats contribute to creating a sense of
despair and hopelessness about a suspect’s perceptions of his availa-
ble options during interrogation. This may be especially the case
when one is not merely being promised leniency, but being prom-
ised complete freedom (i.e., immunity) in exchange for making a
110. Kassin et al., supra note 60, at 12, 18–19.
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statement while being threatened with a harsh outcome if one ref-
uses. There may be no psychological interrogation technique more
potent than the use of threats and promises.
In my remaining time, what I want to talk about, which is why I
think I was invited to be here, certainly not to make negative com-
ments about the Michigan Supreme Court—although I want you to
consider in those comments all the positive things I’ve said about
this great university and this great law school, so it’s a juxtaposition.
There are a lot of ways we can talk about causation, and philoso-
phers and statisticians would probably reprimand us for talking in
the loosey-goosey way that sometimes we do. The word “cause” may
be the wrong word to use here. What I want to talk about are three
processes that tend to be sequential and that explain how and why
you get a false confession that is false but appears to be true. It not
only appears to be true, but appears to be persuasively true. So
often when introduced into evidence at trial, these false confessions
lead to a wrongful conviction.
There are three processes here: misclassification, coercion, and
contamination. We actually heard a lot in Dr. Barnes’s excellent
talk this morning about the sources of misclassification in so-called
Shaken Baby or Abusive Head Trauma cases and other cases involv-
ing injury or death to babies that set over-zealous medical
professionals, child workers and especially police in motion, that
lead to coercive interrogations and false confessions. How is it that
somebody who is factually innocent or did not commit a crime is
judged to be guilty? And then subjected to a guilt-presumptive in-
terrogation, as Adrian Thomas and Nga Truong were? These are, in
fact, guilt-presumptive interrogations.
The interrogation training manuals teach police to be human lie
detectors. They spread misinformation, dishonestly and falsely in
their manuals and training programs, misrepresent the science,
and weasel their way out by claiming that these are just a cluster of
symptoms that are associated with lying.111 If somebody is nervous,
if their eyes are looking downward, if they’re evasive, if they’re too
sincere, if they’re not sincere enough, if they’re slouching in their
chair, picking lint off their jacket, running their hands through
their hair, too close to you—these manuals are so absurd from a
scientific standpoint that they actually have pictures of people
slouching in chairs and claiming that this is how people lie.112 As if
there are ways of sitting that, like Pinocchio’s nose, tell you whether
somebody is lying or telling the truth. But this isn’t the whole story.
111. See INBAU, REID, BUCKLEY & JAYNE, supra note 72, at 101–37.
112. Id. at 121–28.
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And I just want to say, since I mentioned it, this is some data from a
study that Dr. Paul Ekman and Maureen O’Sullivan did113 showing
that most people simply can’t judge when somebody is lying or tell-
ing the truth based on their demeanor. The groups being studied
were all lie-catchers or people like police interrogators whose pro-
fession it is to judge the veracity of statements that are being made
by those they work with. But this isn’t the whole story. Part of the
story is that police are poorly trained, that they come to believe that
they have this gut hunch, this sixth sense that they know whether or
not somebody is lying or telling the truth, and they rush to
judgment.114
In the Adrian Thomas case, the rush to judgment was based on
the emergency room doctor telling the detectives that the baby was
murdered and that he had a fractured skull, despite the fact that
the CAT scan showed he didn’t have a fractured skull. Their mind
was made up. They were set to go, they never considered or looked
at any contradictory evidence, though there were mountains of it
right in front of their eyes for them to see. In the Nga Truong case,
they simply decided she had to have done it because the baby—and
I’m sure this happened, I’m sure Dr. Barnes can tell so many stories
about this—the baby experienced the symptoms that ultimately led
to its death, even though he had this history of respiratory
problems, while she was watching the baby. She was the one who
discovered that the baby was not breathing and called 911. Her boy-
friend, the father of the baby, was in the room with her but he was
sleeping. So it had to be her, right?
The first issue is: how does the misclassification occur? That’s es-
pecially important for the subject of today’s symposium. The
second issue, then, is: once you get an innocent person in the inter-
rogation room, how is that they are made to falsely confess? We’ve
talked a little bit about this with the Adrian Thomas and the Nga
Truong case. But the big picture psychology, as Richard Ofshe and
I have argued115 for many years, is that interrogation, psychologi-
cally, is a two-step process: convince somebody they’re caught, their
situation’s hopeless, there’s no way out, no one’s going to believe
they’re innocent. Decimate their subjective self-confidence that
they are going to get out of this without agreeing that they are
guilty of something, or they did something, they did the act. And
113. Cf. Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913,
916 (1991).
114. Cf. id. at 916–17.
115. See generally Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 73 (discussing the
two steps to obtaining a false confession that occurs pre- and post-admission).
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then when you’ve broken them and destroyed their resistance, con-
vince them that—and this is the counterintuitive part that bedevils
lawyers and law professors—that it’s somehow in their self-interest,
somehow in their self-interest to stop denying and start admitting.
This image is from a Los Angeles police department training
manual, and this says it better than long-winded academics like
me.116 The italicized part is essentially the two-step psychology of
police interrogation. Interrogation operates on the principle of
“You did it, we know you did it. Adrian Thomas, Nga Truong, we
know you did it absolutely. We have overwhelming evidence to
prove you did it.” They lie about that evidence when they don’t
have it, as they did in both of those cases. But the reason makes a
difference. That’s the inducement, that’s the counterintuitive step
to get somebody to agree that confessing is in their best interest.
“So why don’t you tell me about it?”
I will say more about these two steps and how resistance is broken
down and how the police create isolation and get the suspect onto
their turf into an interrogation room. There may be some rapport-
building, usually the part that precedes the Miranda warnings. Ac-
cusation, domination, this overwhelming sense of self-confidence.
Police are trained to do this. Some of you in this room are familiar
with the Reid Method, right? They are trained only to interrogate
116. Rick Papke, The Confrontation Interrogation Technique, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T 1
(1995).
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people whom they think are guilty, and that the goal of an interro-
gation should be to get a confession from whom they presume to be
guilty.117 They signal the expectation that the person will talk, and
they challenge the denials, which they expect, as false and contra-
dicted by logic or evidence or the detective’s experience. They
pressure and persuade the subject to stop denying and start agree-
ing to the accusations.
Now, I’ve talked already a lot about lies of evidence in the con-
text of Adrian Thomas and Nga Truong. And police are allowed to
lie about anything in the interrogation room so long as it does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process voluntariness stan-
dard, which is vague. Police interrogation deception is, as many of
you know, merely one factor in the totality of circumstances test,
and it is not dispositive. Moreover, interrogation is not considered
to be inherently, or even most of the time, coercive. Police, I think,
do or would take their cues from the courts if the courts were ag-
gressive in policing police deception and lies about non-existent
evidence, whether it’s eyewitness or alleged scientific evidence or
failed polygraph evidence. I heard Dr. Barnes, in his excellent talk,
mention something about exculpatory polygraphs. I may have not
heard that right. But I just want to say, there’s no such thing as an
exculpatory polygraph. So if I did hear that right, there’s no science
behind polygraphy. There’s no way you could say a polygraph by
itself is exculpatory.
Maybe that offends some of the defense attorneys. I know you
line up your experts and you make your cases. But there’s simply no
science behind polygraphy. It’s not even junk science—it’s junk. It’s
simply correlating emotional arousal to questions. If there is emo-
tional arousal in response some of the questions, it could be for a
hundred different reasons having nothing to do with whether the
person is lying or telling the truth. There’s no unique physiological
response like the nose growing that could possibly be associated
with lying. Now some people talk about micro-expressions in the
face, but until we discover Pinocchio’s nose, it’s junk science. I un-
derstand why, from the perspective of a defense attorney, you
would do that strategically, however.
I want to go back to the Adrian Thomas case. They convinced
him it was just an accident and that he would go home if he con-
fessed. The implication was very clear: if it was an accident, he was
117. See generally LOUIS C. SENESE, ANATOMY OF INTERROGATION THEMES: THE REID TECH-
NIQUE OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (John E. Reid & Assoc. 2005) (discussing
interview and interrogation techniques that use an accusatory process by which the investiga-
tor tells the suspect she or he is guilty and involves less question/answer format).
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not criminally liable. They told him—when they were lying to
him—that his wife had said he did this. She hadn’t. And they would
put it on her if he didn’t do what they said he did. These are just
more explicit versions of inducements that police use to get some-
body to think it’s in their self-interest to confess. Indeed, they have
a whole manual of inducements by crime, you know. In the Shaken
Baby cases, it’s often, “You were stressed out, you were frustrated,
anybody would have understood. We’ve all been parents. The baby
was screaming.” These inducements often communicate leniency
and they often communicate reward and benefit to motivate the
confessions.
There’s just one thing I want to talk about in these studies. These
studies look at what’s called diagnosticity.118 If you induce true and
false confessions in the laboratory, albeit to lower level transgres-
sions like cheating in university environments, what techniques
induce a high rate of true relative to false confessions? Those would
be good techniques. What techniques induce high rates of false rel-
ative to true confessions? Those would be bad techniques, right?
Those would be techniques that we could say increase the risk fac-
tors for false confession. That is the important point to come out of
here because, as many police and prosecutors will point out, you
can coerce true confessions. How do you know the confession’s
false? You don’t. How you get the confession explains why the per-
son confessed. It isn’t evidence that the confession is false. It might
be true. It might be also evidence that there’s increased risk. You
have to look at the confession against the suspect’s knowledge base,
assuming there’s been no contamination, and against the physical
evidence and alterative explanations if the physical evidence is
ambiguous.
Contamination is the leaking or disclosing of non-public case
facts to the suspect.119 This is the third process in the sequence of
118. See generally Allyson J. Horgan, Melissa B. Russano & Christian A. Meissner, Minimiza-
tion and Maximization Techniques: Assessing the Perceived Consequences of Confessing and Confession
Diagnosticity, 18 PSYCHOL., CRIME, & L. 65 (2012) (examining how techniques that manipulate
the perceived consequences of confessing influence the decision to confess and the diagnos-
tic value of the confession evidence); see also Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and
False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481, 484 (2005) (find-
ing that the use of minimization techniques and an offer of leniency increased both true and
false confessions).
119. See generally Richard A. Leo & Steven A. Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to False
Confession and Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CUR-
RENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A.
Meissner eds., 2010).
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errors that lead to false but seemingly true (and thus seemingly per-
suasive) confessions.120 So police misclassify somebody who’s
innocent, subject them to a guilt-presumptive interrogation, use co-
ercive, psychologically coercive, high-pressure techniques. Some
individuals are vulnerable. We have lots of clinical data about who
those are and why the person admits to a crime they did not com-
mit.121 Now, typically an admission is agreeing to something. It’s not
getting in the confessional and giving an act of confession. The con-
fession is made. It’s not given. In the post-admission phase as well as
the pre-admission phase, police often suggest details.
Brandon Garrett, a very well-known, excellent researcher at the
University of Virginia Law School, has done studies of the DNA
cases, looking at how many of them have contamination, where the
subjects were fed non-public facts.122 One of the cases he men-
tioned was the Bruce Godschalk case where this person got
convicted and spent fifteen years in prison for raping two women
he didn’t even know.123 He had never set foot in the apartment
complex. I just want to mention one of these facts: prior to having
sex with one of the victims, the assailant removed the victim’s tam-
pon and tossed it to the side.124 I would have convicted him if I had
been on that jury, right?
Details like that make confessions appear to be true, even though
the details almost certainly come from police. So we’ve got misclas-
sification, coercion/vulnerable personalities, contamination or
feeding of details. One of the reasons why the full electronic re-
cording of interrogations is so important, that together lead to a
statement that looks like it’s true, but is not the product typically of
coercion and manifestly false. But for DNA in the cases that Bran-
don Garrett looked at, these people would almost certainly still be
in prison. He found in his first study, I believe, ninety-seven per-
cent,125 the second one ninety-four percent of the DNA cases—as
best he could tell from limited records in many of those cases—
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051 (2010) (examining how police procedures can feed detailed and accurate information
to accused individuals and elicit false confessions).
123. See id. at 1078.
124. Godschalk v. Montgomery Cty. Dist. Atty’s Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 369 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
125. See Garrett, supra note 122, at 1054 (noting that in ninety-seven percent of the ex-
onerees for whom trial or pretrial records could be obtained, police reported that suspects
confessed to specific details concerning how the crime occurred).
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involved contamination, because all but one lacked a full recording
and many had no recording.126
I’m not going to talk about the ways in which we could change
the system for the better to minimize false confession evidence. But
if we wanted to do so, these are basically the leading reforms: at the
very front end would be electronic recording, improved training,
and at the back end—meaning further along in the process where
the errors have accumulated and are harder to undo—would be
cautionary jury instructions and allowing more expert witness testi-
mony on the science of false confessions. The Michigan Supreme
Court’s decision in Kowalski is not only erroneous and misguided,
but it is contradicted by all of the scientific research going back
decades on interrogations and false confessions. I think expert wit-
ness testimony is necessary in this area. I think it’s helpful. I think it
can make a difference, but I don’t think it is the best or most im-
portant reform for preventing wrongful convictions based on false
confessions.
The last point I will make is that we need front-end reforms more
than we need back-end reforms. We need a state supreme court
that will get it right and admit experts where the science supports it.
But that’s not the most important reform. The most important re-
form is to make sure that we get valid and reliable information
going into the stream of evidence that eventually leads to trial in
three percent of the cases, though probably more in the cases that
are the subject of today’s symposium. We need those reforms more
importantly at the front-end.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m an attorney working in post-conviction
cases. I know that false confessions are a problem when an individ-
ual who’s accused of child abuse confesses. But the problem I’ve
been grappling with are child abuse prevalence studies in this area
are based on cases that have confirmed child abuse based on a con-
fession. For example, I’ve come across a study that said, “We found
these injuries, we suspected child abuse, an investigation confirmed
the caretaker shook the baby,” which I suspect is a confession. The
authors say at the end of a three-case study summary, they say,
“Therefore, we find when a baby’s shaken, you’ll find these inju-
ries.” Or, “If you find these injuries, it’s likely child abuse.” The
126. See Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 410
(2015).
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problem I’m grappling with is, when there’s not an individual con-
fession by the defendant, how do you address the false confession
literature when the studies themselves are based on confessions?
Does that make sense?
RICHARD LEO: So I think what you’re talking about is not the false
confession literature, but I think you’re taking about—correct me if
I’m wrong—the Shaken Baby literature that uses confession evi-
dence to verify the accuracy of the allegations.
AM: Yes. Correct.
RL: Keith Findley of the University of Wisconsin and Saul Kassin,
who I mentioned earlier, Larry White, who’s a psychologist at Beloit
College in Wisconsin, and another individual are doing a study of
that.127 They’re going back and getting Shaken Baby cases and look-
ing at where there were confessions, and looking at those
confessions to see if they were problematic, as happened in some of
the University of Wisconsin Innocence Project cases that Keith has
litigated. So that study is in the works.
The body of research on confessions and false confessions is volu-
minous, and that literature should give us pause about the validity
or accuracy of confessions in part or in whole where we don’t have
independent corroboration, with a fully recorded interrogation. So
in the absence of the study that Keith Findley et al. are doing now—
and no doubt others will do as well in the future—I think the next
best go-to is the reason why confessions cannot corroborate. If you
think about it, confessions are testimonial evidence. They’re malle-
able. It’s very easy to manipulate testimonial evidence, particularly
in the conditions in which it was elicited in cases like Shaken Baby
cases. I wish I could give you a better roadmap to challenge it, but I
think that’s where we’re at right now.
127. Keith Findley et al., The Diagnostic Significance of Confessions in Shaken Baby Syndrome
and Abusive Head Trauma Cases (forthcoming).
